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 Abstract: The highly influential idea that the artist’s task is to represent and copy nature as 
closely as possible became well-known in Seneca’s wording (omnis ars naturae imitatio est). By 
investigating this formula, the present study aims to find answers to the question whether it was 
really this idea that Seneca regarded as the purpose and essence of a work of art. Comparing 
Seneca’s texts with other Stoic sources, the paper gives an analysis of the meanings of the 
concepts techne/ars, including the fine arts as we know them today, and mimesis/imitatio. 
Seneca’s negative value-judgement of the fine arts is relativized by being embedded in the 
interrelationships in his philosophy; nor can imitatio be interpreted in the fields of sculpture and 
painting as the passive reflection of reality, as mere copying. 
 Keywords: techne, ars, natura, mimesis, imitatio, Stoics, Seneca, fine arts. 
 
The notion – ars naturae imitatio est –, which became an integral part of Euro-
pean thinking in Seneca’s words1, served as the theoretical underpinning for 
lifelike portrayal for a number of centuries. According to this, the artists’s task 
is to represent: imitate, copy and reflect nature as close as possible.2 But is this 
really what Seneca regarded as the essence of fine arts as we know them today, 
and above all, of sculpture and painting? This is a group of issues encompass-
ing several problems which largely derive from the fact that the terms making 
up the apparently clear and unambiguous definitions carry highly complex 
meanings depending not only on the philosophical context (Platonist, Aristote-
lian, Stoic) but even within the philosophy of Stoicism, too. 
 The first, most obvious task is to investigate those places in Seneca’s works 
where the Stoic philosopher defines his position on the function and value of 
arts and on the place they occupy in human life. We need to see that the ques-
tion which is so important to us had marginal importance for Seneca, as did for 
other philosophers in Antiquity. Art belongs in the extremely broad category of 

 1 Sen., Ep. 65,3. On the Platonic and Aristotelian roots of topos, see Solmsen 1963; Close 
1971, 163-175; Büttner 2006, 62; Inwood 2007, 139.  
 2 Cf. Büttner 2006,11ff. 
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ars, which, like Greek techne, encompasses all kinds of theoretical and practi-
cal abilities, skills, and knowledge. It seems that Seneca does not mark out the 
exact place of the fine arts in the system of artes. In Letter 88 (§§ 21-22), quot-
ing Posidonius, he divides them into four groups (artes vulgares et sordidae, 
ludicrae, pueriles and liberales), however, fine arts are not represented among 
the concrete examples. 3   
 It is certain that he excludes them from among the artes liberales 4 thus they 
are most likely to be grouped among the artes ludicrae.5 Their value, or rather 
their lack of value, is basically determined by the fact that, according to the 
teaching of the philosophy of Stoicism, all the goods lying between the final 
good (virtue) and its opposite are indifferent. Nevertheless, within the artes 
belonging to the indifferent things artes liberales should be preferred, which, 
even though they do not belong to virtue, assist the man who wants to reach the 
final good as a propedeutic.6 However, sculpture and painting as luxuriae min-
istri definitely cannot be classified among these. The stance of Seneca the phi-
losopher on judging arts, thus seems definite and clear: as servants of luxury 
and pleasure, they are not only useless and superfluous but unabiguously harm-
ful, too.7 The question is, on the one hand, whether this value judgement is in 
agreement with the Stoic outlook, and on the other hand, whether it can be 
brought into connection with the manner of the creation of works of art desig-
nated by the term ars naturae imitatio est. 
 Contrary to the above, ars (techne), comprising also fine arts and the 
craftsman (artifex, technites) are concepts of central significance both generally 
in the philosophy of Stoicism and for Seneca, too. This is not merely about the 

 3 In Consolatio ad Marciam (18,7) he distinguishes three groups of artes: quae vitam instru-
ant, quae ornent, quae regant. 
 4Ep. 88,18 non enim adducor, ut in numerum liberalium artium pictores recipiam, non magis 
quam statuarios aut marmorarios aut ceteros luxuriae ministros. 
 5 Ep. 88,21vulgares (sc. artes) opificum, quae manu constant et ad instruendam vitam oc-
cupatae sunt, in quibus nulla decoris, nulla honesti simulatio est. ludicrae sunt, quae ad volup-
tatem oculorum atque aurium tendunt. For the latter, however, he does not bring works of fine art 
as examples, rather, structures whose functioning arouses admiration in the ignorant, the incom-
petent. Cf. Democritus’ distinction between techne stemming from needs and unnecessry: DK 68 
B 144 (Philodemus, De mus. 108,29ff. Kemke). 
 6 Ep. 88,20 (sc. artes liberales) animum ad accipiendam virtutem praeparant. Cf. Ep. 62,1 on 
the value of studia liberalia: mentiuntur, qui sibi obstare ad studia liberalia turbam negotiorum 
videri volunt: simulant occupationes et augent et ipsi se occupant; Nat. VII 32 quis philosophiam 
aut ullum liberale respicit studium, nisi cum ludi intercalantur, cum aliquis pluvius intervenit 
dies, quem perdere libet. Cf. Costa 1992, 190ff. 
 7 Also in Letter 88.,Seneca draws a comparison between the exaggerated cultivation and the 
senseless collection, hoarding of valuable, otherwise useless things (most likely art treasures) of 
artes liberales (§§36-37). 
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artist analogy considered a topos in Stoic texts as well, used to elucidate the 
most diverse philosophical theories.8  
 In Stoic physics, one aspect of god defined in several ways is the craftsman, 
who forms kosmos from matter (hyle).9 Zeno called god „a designing fire which 
methodically proceeds towards the creation of the world”.10 In the process of 
creation the god creates its creation, that is, nature, with which it is identified11 
as reason (logos).12 According to Cicero, there is no substancial, only quantita-
tive difference, between the craftsman-like fire, that is, nature and human artes: 
the former’s activity is „much more artistic”, this is how it can be the master of 
all other crafts. 13 There are, however, other limitations to the parallel between 
god as artifex and human creation. Greek philosophy, starting with Xenophanes 
to the contemporary Epicureans unanimously rejected the thought of divine 
action involving effort,14 thus, in the continuation of the above Cicero text, 
Balbus stresses that effort is alien to god, as is Epicurean idleness.15 In addition, 
the immanent divine craftsman works away on natural things not from the out-
side and superficially but from the inside, totally pervading them.16 Unlike the 
human craftsman, he cannot create something such that in the meantime he 
„copies” it onto some external object as if looking at a model: he cannot pay 
attention to anybody else but himself in the same way as creator and creation 
are the same: nature/god is simultaneously natura naturans and natura natu-
rata.17  
 The valuelessness of fine arts was contradicted by the fact that technai ap-
peared rather intriguing to the Stoics, of whom Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysip-

 8 Cf. SVF III 301 (Phidias’ art exemplifies the unity of sophia and techne); SVF II 1132 
(nature strives for profit, advantage and delight, as is clear from human craft), SVF III 311 (the 
analogy of dynamis pervading hyle and the bronze sculptor). Wildberger 2006 I, 15-16. 
 9 LS 44 B. 
 10 LS 46 A (= SVF II 1027), SVF II 1133, 1134, cf. SVF II 423, LS 46 D (= SVF I 120). 
 11 Stoic God is present in his own creation, cf. SVF II 323, 1044, 1135; Wildberger II 482-3, 
note 104. 
 12 Cf. SVF I 530, 532, II 1025. 
 13 Cic., N. D. II 57 Zeno igitur naturam ita definit, ut eam dicat ignem esse artificiosum, ad 
gignendum progredientem via. Censet enim artis maxume proprium esse creare et gignere; quod-
que in operibus nostrarum artium manus efficiat, id multo artificiosius naturam efficere, id est, ut 
dixi, ignem artificiosum, magistrum artium reliquarum. (58) natura non artificiosa solum, sed 
plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur.; Cic., Leg. I 26 (SVF II 1162). 
 14 Not even movement befits (epiprepei) the god of Xenophanes: DK 21 B 26; Epikuros: KD 1. 
 15 Cic., N. D. II 59 appareat multitudo nec cessantium deorum nec ea, quae agant, molien-
tium cum labore operoso ac molesto. 
 16 SVF II 1044, 323, 1135; cf. Nesselrath 1985, 203-204;Wildberger 2006, II 482-3, note 104; 
Bénatouїl 2009, 25-26.  
 17 Cf. Solmsen 1963, 496; Zagdoun 2000, 11. 
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pus wrote books with the same title.18 According to Nesselrath, it was the Stoa 
itself that systematised the concept of techne – vis-a-vis that of Aristotle – into 
an improved system, thereby giving it the form which made it decisive for the 
entire later Antiquity.19 In Stoic philosophy, techne, with an extended content,20 
includes virtue (arete) and the individual types of virtue, episteme, and philoso-
phy itself (techne peri ton bion). Its value is unambiguously marked by the fact 
that it was ranked among the things to be preferred (proegmena), due to its 
usefulness (chreia).21  
 The concept of techne is closely linked with the theory of oikeiosis, the pil-
lar of Stoic ethics. In accordance with this, nature endows living beings with 
artes itself: this is why the spider, for example, is able to make a web.22 Nature 
provides for people in a different way: it teaches them such that ratio should 
invent artes, and, together with them, invents things necessary for life, imitat-
ing nature.23 From all this it does not follow, however, that usefulness would be 
the exclusive criterion of artes, nor is it the only criterion for the divine creator: 
the only function of the tail of a peacock, the feathers of a bird or the beard of 
men can be beauty.24 By the same analogy, an instance of delighting can be 
equally regarded as the purpose of human creation. If the divine master can 
portray something merely for its beauty, then why should we reject the same 
thing in the case of the human master as an utterly useless thing?  
 Seneca gives a detailed account of the essence of artes and its place in hu-
man life in his letter 90., written to and polemizing with Posidonius.25 Contest-
ing the views of the Rhodes philosopher about the origin and development of 
culture, Seneca expresses strikingly opposing views on artes, too. While ac-
cording to Posidonius, artes were invented by wise people (sapientes), Seneca 
keeps artes employed in everyday life definitely distinct from philosophy,26 

 18 Cf. SVF I 41, 481, II 16, 17. 
 19 Nesselrath 1985, 138. 
 20 For a definition see. SVF I 490, 73. 
 21 SVF III 127, 136, 516, 189 (=Cic., Fin. III 18 artes etiam ipsas propter se assumendas pu-
tamus, cum quia sit in iis aliquid dignum assumptione, tum quod constent ex cognitionibus et 
contineant quiddam in se ratione constitutum et via.). Cf. Nesselrath 1985, 142, 183. 
 22 Sen., Ep. 121, 22. 
 23 SVF II 1162 (Cic., Leg. I 26 Artes vero innumerabiles repertae sunt, docente natura. Quam 
imitata ratio res ad vitam necessarias sollerter consecuta est. 
 24 SVF II 1165 (Cic., N. D. I 47) , SVF II 1166 (Cic., Fin. III 18), SVF II 1167 (Lact., Inst. 
div. II 10). 
 25 Cf. Pfligersdorffer 1982; Costa 1992, 203-213; Szekeres 1995,58-78. 
 26 Ep. 90,7 artes quidem a philosophia inventas quibus in cotidiano vita utitur non concesse-
rim.; cf. §11. 
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linking them to luxuria.27 Artes attributable to human ingenuity (sagacitas), like 
inventions, create goods which are considered indifferent (adiaphora) as they 
have nothing to do with the final good realized in virtue, the ultimate purpose 
of human life (telos). All artes are concerned with the body which was once the 
servant of them, however, by now the body has become their lord, their master 
(§19.). The goods attributable to the crafts (artes) do not cater for real human 
needs, are thus entirely unnecessary and only serve meaningless luxury.28 He 
supports his argumentation with this obviously Epicurean notion: real needs are 
taken care of by nature itself.29 Nature, one of whose aspects is providence 
(pronoia) in Stoic philosophy, does not expect man, like any other living be-
ings, to make great effort to sustain life.30 Ars being a synonym of luxuria in 
Seneca’s terminology and luxuria being the opposite of natura, it seems self-
evident to him to strikingly oppose nature artes.31 We need to stress that all this 
applies to the crafts serving the body, whereas the letter reaches its climax in its 
portrayal of the ars whose value is undeniable and which leads to virtue.32 The 
real artifex is sapientia, as life’s creator or craftsman (artifex vitae),33 which is 
served by all artes. 
 To sum up the above: in contrast with the Stoic view somewhat generously 
labelled general that there is a close relationship between techne and physis, 
techne being useful and techne being teachable-learnable, Seneca accepts only 
the latter as valid for all artes. The artes linkable to the body are not useful and 

 27 Ep. 90, 9 mihi crede, felix illud saeculum ante architectos fuit, ante tectores. ista nata sunt 
iam nascente luxuria; §19. a natura luxuria descivit, quae cotidie se ipsa incitat et tot saeculis cre-
scit et ingenio adiuvat vitia. 
 28 Cf. Sen., Helv. 11,4-5. 
 29 Ep. 90, 15 posse nos habere usibus nostris necessaria si contenti fuerimus iis quae terra 
posuit in summo; §§16-18; cf. Sen., Ep. 4,10-11; 60,3; 110,10-11; de vita beata 8,2; Epic., ep. 
Men. 130; KD XV.   
 30 Ep. 90, 18 non fuit tam inimica natura ut, cum omnibus aliis animalibus facile actum vitae 
daret, homo solus non posset sine tot artibus vivere (…) ad parata nati sumus (…) sufficit ad id 
natura quod poscit. 
 31 Ep. 90, 16 Non desiderabis artifices: sequere naturam. In his Letter 121 discussing the 
theory of oikeiosis (conciliatio) (§§22-24.) Seneca distinguishes those abilities of animals with 
which provident nature endowed them to help their survival (artes) and the learned crafts of man: 
nascitur ars ista, non discitur. He considers human artes definitely lower than the innate artes of 
animals imposed on them by nature, with which man cannot compete: non vides, quam nulli mor-
talium imitabilis illa aranei textura? (§22.) Later Marcus Aurelius XI 10 argues, from a reverse 
angle, for the fact that nature cannot lag behind artistic creation. 
 32 Ep. 90,44 Non enim dat natura virtutem: ars est bonum fieri. 
 33 Ep. 90, 27; cf. Ep. 29,3; 31,6; 95,7-8; 117,12, Vit. beat. 8,3. 
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are contrary to nature. Based on Seneca’s argumentation, ars proper, which 
meets every single criterion, is exclusively striving towards virtue (§44).34  
 In Seneca’s works we find several texts where god is artifex and divine ac-
tivity is ars.35 The basis question, however, is how god carries out creation, 
what the object and purpose of his creation is and whether all this can be related 
to the activity of human craftsmen (artifices)?  
 It seems obvious to draw a comparison between the activities of the divine 
and human craftsman. However, in accordance with the Stoic outlook, the ob-
ject of god’s creative activity, as a consequence of the identity of god and na-
ture, is itself.36 This automatically excludes the possibility of describing the 
process of creation in the case of divine and human artifex alike as imitatio 
(mimesis), as was customary in antiquity, irrespective of philosophical stand-
ing.37 Mimesis, however we define it, presupposes an external reality independ-
ent of the creator which he, according to the general mindset, somehow reflects 
in his work. Still, the concept of imitatio can often be found in Seneca’s works, 
however, it is not primarily used to serve the characterization of the activity of 
artifex. With Seneca, imitatio is above all the imitatio of god: man striving to-
wards the perfecta virtus intends to reach his goal ”imitating”, following god, 
competing with him.38 God, from another aspect, nature, is rational through and 
through,39 his reason is perfect at that. Reason (and far from being perfecta 
ratio) is only one part of man, but even that makes him, uniquely among all 
living things, capable of understanding the world and „imitating” it.40 All this is 
thus made possible by the substantial relationship between god and man, the 

 34 For the teachability of virtue, see Ep. 88,32; 95,56; 123,16.  
 35 Ep. 58,28; 71,14; Prov. I 5,9; de Otio 4,3; Nat. II 45,1. 
 36 Sen., Ben. IV 8,2 Quocumque te flexeris, ibi illum videbis occurrentem tibi. nihil ab illo 
vacat: opus suum ipse implet. Cf. Wildberger 2006 II, 482-3. 
 37 From the extensive literature on mimesis see recently: Halliwell 2002.  
 38 Sen., Ep. 95,50 Vis deos propitiare? bonus esto. satis illos coluit, quisquis imitatus est; Ep. 
104,23 magnanimos nos natura produxit et ut quibusdam animalibus ferum dedit, quibusdam 
subdolum, quibusdam pavidum, ita nobis gloriosum et excelsum spiritum, quaerentem ubi hone-
stissime, non ubi tutissime vivat, simillimum mundo, quem, quantum mortalium passibus licet, 
sequitur aemulaturque. According to Wildberger 2006 I, 271: “Während Seneca sehr oft davon 
spricht, daß man Gott nachahmen und sich ihm angleichen müsse (…), findet man solche Gedan-
ken für andere Stoikern seltener belegt.” At the same time the idea shows close affinity with Plato 
(Theaet. 176b). Cf. Fischer 2008,14-5., Sedley 2005, 132. 
 39 Sen., Nat. I praef. 14. 
 40 Sen., de Ira II 15,2 Quid est autem cur hominem ad tam infelicia exempla revoces, cum 
habeas mundum deumque, quem ex omnibus animalibus ut solus imitetur, solus intellegit? Cf. 
Cic., Tusc. V 70. 
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fact that the human soul is, in fact, an offshoot (apospasma) of god.41 Thus 
imitatio naturae is identical with imitatio dei, of which ratio, is a means on the 
one hand,42 and the goal on the other, since the final good – living in accor-
dance with nature, that is, with god – is identical to perfect agreement with 
divine reason, to acquiring the perfected reason (perfecta ratio).43 Conse-
quently, for Seneca naturae imitatio can by no means mean mere copying in the 
field of ethics since its condition is the understanding of the world (nature, 
god). But it cannot mean this in the realm of human crafts, – implicitly, the fine 
arts –, either.  
 Referring to Posidonius in Letter 90, Seneca gives a detailed account of the 
birth of the two artes: that of a baker’s trade (§§22-3.) and of sailing (§24.). 
Both came into being as a result of the imitatio of nature, with man himself 
being the model in the former, more precisely, the processes of chewing and 
digestion, and the movement of fish in the water in the latter. Imitatio means 
the interpretation and modelling or independent recreation of two natural phe-
nomena or mechanisms.44 Maybe we are not rash in concluding from this that 
the likeness of a painting to the portrayed object does not necessarily mean 
mechanical copying, mirror-like correspondence, either.45 In letter 9, (§7) we 
can read a highly interesting remark about the fact that for the painter, painting 
itself represents greater joy than the finished work ,46 which conjures up in us 

 41 Sen., Ep. 92,30 Quid est autem cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid exsistere, qui dei pars 
est? totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus: et socii sumus eius et membra. Cf. Cic., 
Tusc. V 38 humanus autem animus decerptus ex mente divina; LS 53 X; Rist 2010, 264-5. 
 42 Sen., Ep. 66,39 bonum sine ratione nullum est: sequitur autem ratio naturam. “quid est ergo 
ratio?” naturae imitatio; Cf. Vitr. II 1,6; Inwood 2007, 175. 
 43 Sen., Ep. 92,2 in hoc uno positam esse beatam vitam, ut in nobis ratio perfecta sit. On 
Seneca’s definition on telos see also Ep. 5,4 propositum nostrum est secundum naturam vivere; 
Ep. 66,39 “quod est summum hominis bonum?” ex naturae voluntate se gerere; Vit. beat. 8,1 
natura enim duce utendum est. hanc ratio observat, hanc consulit. Idem est ergo beate vivere et 
secundum naturam; Ot. sap. 5,1. Cf. Börger 1980, 9-15. 
 44 A similar conclusion is reached by Köller 1975, 190-1., who believes that in Seneca’s 
artistic interpretation, instead of Plato’ concept of mimesis, its older meaning also determining the 
Aristotelian concept of mimesis (“portrayal”) is reflected. According to this, “mimesis bedeutet 
nicht: illusionistisch gespiegelt, sondern in der Handlung als eine den Menschen angehende 
Wahrheit vergegenwärtigt.” Cf. Solmsen 1963, 486ff. It should be noted that the mimesis = re-
flection theory, traditionally based on Plat., Rep. X 596b-598d , shold be called the theory at-
tributed to Plato. On Plato’s differential interpretation of mimesis see Halliwell 2002 passim, 
especially 58ff; 118ff.; Büttner 2006, 13ff.  
 45 Sen., Ep. 71,2 nemo, quamvis paratos habeat colores, similitudinem reddet, nisi iam con-
stat, quid velit pingere. Cf. Kölle 1975, 172ff. 
 46 Attalus philosophus dicere solebat: “iucundius esse amicum facere quam habere. quomodo 
artifici iucundius pingere est quam pinxisse.” Illa in opere suo occupata sollicitudo ingens oblec-
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the image of the industrious divine artifex 47 as well as that of the Stoic phi-
losopher toiling unrelentlessly until the end of his life.48 If the comparison 
holds, then, for the human artifices creation itself is an activity which resem-
bles the divine activity that shapes the world and brings joy, whose valuable 
nature can hardly be questioned. And the much-studied Letter 6549 reveals the 
fact that Seneca’s interpretation of Plato also contradicts the theory of mimesis 
= mirror-like correspondence. 
 In the letter Seneca uses the well-known sculptor analogy to elucidate the 
relationship between Stoic cause (causa) and matter (materia) (65,3): Omnis 
ars naturae imitatio est. itaque quod de universo dicebam, ad haec transfer, 
quae ab homine facienda sunt: statua et materiam habuit, quae pateretur arti-
ficem, et artificem, qui materiae daret faciem. ergo in statua materia aes fuit, 
causa opifex. In the continuation, confronting Stoic theory with Aristotle’s and 
Plato’s turba causarum (§11.), he names idea (§7.) as the fifth one in the line of 
Plato’s causes: His quintam Plato adicit exemplar, quam ipse ’idean’ vocat: hoc 
est enim, ad quod respiciens artifex id, quod destinabat, effecit. nihil autem ad 
rem pertinet, utrum foris habeat exemplar, ad quod referat oculos, an intus, 
quod ibi ipse concepit et posuit. haec exemplaria rerum omnium deus intra se 
habet numerosque universorum, quae agenda sunt, et modos mente conplexus 
est: plenus his figuris est, quas Plato ’ideas’ appellat, inmortales, inmutabiles, 
infatigabiles.50 The text regarded as a valuable source of the early history of 
Middle-Platonism51 is interesting to us for several reasons. By suggesting the 
possibility that ideas do not have transcendental existence only but are present 
in god’s mind, he sheds new light on Plato’s demiurge activity, too. Since he 
looks at ideas not as models outside themselves, the process of creation inter-
preted as mimesis cannot mean mere copying, either. On the other hand, this 
kind of interpretation of ideas makes it possible to draw a closer parallel be-
tween Plato’s demiurge and the Stoics’ immanent god. 
 In conclusion we can say that for Seneca in the case of ars belonging to the 
soul (bonum fieri) imitatio naturae involves striving to achieve complete ac-

tamentum habet in ipsa occupatione. non aeque delectatur, qui ab opere perfecto removit manum. 
iam fructu artis suae fruitur: ipsa fruebatur arte, cum pingeret. Cf. Kölle 1975, 157. 
 47 On this question and on the issue of divine activity in ekpyrosis see Bénatouїl 2009. 
 48 De Otio 1,4 certe Stoici nostri dicunt: usque ad ultimum vitae finem in actu erimus, non 
desinemus communi bono operam dare, adiuvare singulos, opem ferre etiam inimicis senili ma-
nu. nos sumus, qui nullis annis vacationem damus (…). 
 49 Cf. Sedley 2005, 134ff. Comments on the letter and literature review, Inwood 2007, 107-
111; 136-155.  
 50 Cf. Cic., Orat. 8-10. 
 51 Cf. Halliwell 2002, 316, note 6; Lowenstam 1998-1999. 
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cordance with nature (god). This accordance can be achieved with the help of 
philosophy, with the acquisition of correctly-judging perfected reason (recta 
ratio). Only the wise, the perfectly moral man (sapiens) possesses recta ratio, 
the ideal man who is hardly exemplified in real life. For the man who wants to 
achieve the greatest human good, virtue, the result of imitatio naturae cannot 
be complete likeness to nature, perfect accord with it,52 since he is only trying 
to understand the ever-changing world governed by divine ratio. All other artes 
are indifferent from the point of view of the final goal, virtue. What is more, the 
artes serving the body as servers of luxury and greed are downright harmful. 
The reason for this, however, is not the mode of the work of art as imitatio, 
rather, the simple fact that the artes belong to the body in sharp contrast to the 
soul.53 This way, the negative judgement of the fine arts, embedded in the inter-
related system of Seneca’s philosophy is merely relative, it becomes sound 
exclusively when contrasted with ars, leading to telos, the ultimate goal of hu-
man life. Imitation, on the other hand, serving to characterize the mode of crea-
tion is an exquisite activity, which in some sense can be likened to that of the 
divine creator, with ratio as its means.  
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